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FIDUCIARY DUTY – NOW AND IN THE FUTURE
Christine Lazaro1
The celebrated jurist Benjamin Cardozo opined that the fiduciary duty is
“the duty of finest loyalty”, and that a fiduciary “is held to something stricter
than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of
an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.”2 The question
most customers have is whether their broker is subject to this duty of finest
loyalty, or if they are bound merely by the morals of the marketplace.
Currently this is a very difficult question to answer, and will depend on
whether the customer is dealing with a broker or an investment adviser,
where the customer is located, the type of account the customer has, among
other things. However, the answer may be made clearer in the coming
months.
With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act3 (“Dodd-Frank”) on July 21, 2010, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) has been tasked with evaluating the
effectiveness of the current legal or regulatory standards for brokers, dealer
and investment advisers. Shortly thereafter, the SEC sought public comment
on the issue. The next step will be for the SEC to decide what steps, if any, it
should take to address the issues raised.
This article will examine the current standards applicable to brokers and
investment advisers in their dealings with customers. It will then discuss
what is required of the SEC pursuant to Dodd-Frank as well as various
viewpoints on the topic.
I.

The Current Standard

Brokers and investment advisors are regulated under two different
regulatory schemes. As such, they are each held to different standards of
1. Christine Lazaro is a Supervising Attorney in the Securities Arbitration Clinic at
St. John's University School of Law, where she supervises students who represent
investors in arbitration claims against brokers. Christine also serves on PIABA's
SRO/Legislation Committee and the New York State Bar Association's Securities
Litigation and Arbitration Committee.
2. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
3. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010).
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conduct in their dealings with customers. Investment advisers are regulated
by the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “IAA”)4 and brokers are
regulated by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “’34 Act”)5.
A. Investment Advisers
Notwithstanding that the IAA does not use the term “fiduciary” in the
context of the standard applicable to investment advisers, case law has
consistently held that “§ 206 [of the IAA] establishes ‘federal fiduciary
standards’ to govern the conduct of investment advisers.”6
Section 206 of the IAA7 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the mails or
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or
indirectly-(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any
client or prospective client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or
prospective client;
(3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell
any security to or purchase any security from a client, or
acting as broker for a person other than such client,
knowingly to effect any sale or purchase of any security for
the account of such client, without disclosing to such client
in writing before the completion of such transaction the
capacity in which he is acting and obtaining the consent of
the client to such transaction. The prohibitions of this
paragraph shall not apply to any transaction with a customer
of a broker or dealer if such broker or dealer is not acting as
an investment adviser in relation to such transaction;

4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 et seq.
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq.
6. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17, 100 S. Ct. 242, 246
(1979) (citing to Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.462, 471, n. 11, 97 S.Ct.
1292, 1300 (1977)); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 481-482, n. 10, 99 S.Ct. 1831,
1839 (1979); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180, 191-192, 84 S.Ct. 275, 282-283 (1963).
7. 15 U.S.C. §80b-6.
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(4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. The Commission
shall, for the purposes of this paragraph (4) by rules and
regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed
to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses of business as
are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
Therefore, if an account is being handled by an investment adviser
pursuant to the IAA, the adviser has a fiduciary duty to the customer. In Sec.
& Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.8, the Court
explained, “The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a
congressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment
advisory relationship,' as well as a congressional intent to eliminate, or at
least to expose, all conflicts of interest which might incline as investment
adviser - consciously or unconsciously - to render advice which was not
disinterested.” The IAA specifically exempts brokers who provide
investment advice, so long as the advice is solely incidental to the brokerage
services, and the broker does not receive special compensation for the
advice.9
B. Brokers
Brokers are not subject to a federal fiduciary standard. The ’34 Act is
worded differently from the IAA, and courts have not held that it creates a
federal fiduciary standard for brokers. Rather, at the federal level, brokers
are held to the “suitability” standard that has been created by the rules of the
self-regulatory organization, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(“FINRA”).10 The suitability standard is set forth in FINRA Rule 231011,
which states in relevant part:

8. 375 U.S. 180, 191-92, 84 S. Ct. 275, 282-83 (1963).
9. 15 U.S.C. §80b-2(a)(11).
10. On July 30, 2007, FINRA was created through the consolidation of the National
Association of Securities Dealers and the member regulation, enforcement and
arbitration operations of the New York Stock Exchange. FINRA is the largest
independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States, and
it oversees nearly 4,700 brokerage firms, and approximately 635,000 registered
securities representatives. See www finra.org (last visited September 9, 2010).
11. FINRA Rules are reviewed by, and ultimately approved by the SEC. See
“FINRA Rulemaking Process”, www finra.org/Industry/Regulation/FINRARules/
RulemakingProcess (last visited September 9, 2010).
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(a) In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or
exchange of any security, a member shall have reasonable
grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for
such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed
by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to
his financial situation and needs.
(b) Prior to the execution of a transaction recommended to a
non-institutional customer, other than transactions with
customers where investments are limited to money market
mutual funds, a member shall make reasonable efforts to
obtain information concerning:
(1) the customer's financial status;
(2) the customer's tax status;
(3) the customer's investment objectives; and
(4) such other information used or considered to be
reasonable by such member or registered representative
in making recommendations to the customer.
Although brokers are subject to this suitability standard when
recommending an investment to a customer, recommendations only account
for a portion of the interaction between brokers and customers. Moreover,
the suitability standard requires that a recommendation merely be suitable for
a customer, not necessarily that it be in the customer’s best interest. Whether
or not a broker owes a customer a fiduciary duty in addition to meeting the
minimum suitability standard varies from state to state.
Certain states recognize a fiduciary duty in every broker – customer
relationship. For example, in California, “[w]ith respect to stockbrokers it is
recognized, ‘The duties of the broker, being fiduciary in character, must be
exercised with the utmost good faith and integrity.’ Meyer, The Law of
Stockbrokers and Stock Exchanges (1931) p. 253.” Twomey v. Mitchum,
Jones & Templeton, Inc.12.
In other states, the duty a broker owes to a customer depends on the
type of account the customer has. Many states recognize that brokers have
limited duties when handling a non-discretionary account:
Defendants' limited definition of a broker's duty to his
customer is correct so long as the customer has a nondiscretionary account with his broker, i.e., an account in
which the customer rather than the broker determines which
purchases and sales to make. In a non-discretionary account
each transaction is viewed singly. In such cases the broker is
12. 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 236 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
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bound to act in the customer's interest when transacting
business for the account; however, all duties to the customer
cease when the transaction is closed. Duties associated with
a non-discretionary account include: (1) the duty to
recommend a stock only after studying it sufficiently to
become informed as to its nature, price and financial
prognosis. Cash v. Frederick and Co., 57 F.R.D. 71
(E.D.Wis.1972); Hanly v. S.E.C., 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir.
1969); (2) the duty to carry out the customer's orders
promptly in a manner best suited to serve the customer's
interests, Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U.S. 365, 28 S.Ct. 512,
52 L.Ed. 835 (1908); Robinson v. Merrill Lynch, 337
F.Supp. 107 (N.D.Ala.1971), Aff'd, 453 F.2d 417 (5th Cir.
1972), and cases cited therein; (3) the duty to inform the
customer of the risks involved in purchasing or selling a
particular security, Hanly v. S.E.C., supra; Cash v. Frederick
and Co., supra; (4) the duty to refrain from self-dealing or
refusing to disclose any personal interest the broker may
have in a particular recommended security, Chasins v. Smith
Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1971); S.E.C. v.
Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 84 S.Ct. 275, 11
L.Ed.2d 237 (1963); (5) the duty not to misrepresent any fact
material to the transaction, Carras v. Burns, [516 F.2d 251,
258 (4th Cir. 1975)]; Shorrock v. Merrill Lynch, CCH
Fed.Sec.L.Rep. P 96,251 (D.Or., Nov. 18, 1977); and (6) the
duty to transact business only after receiving prior
authorization from the customer, Robinson v. Merrill Lynch,
supra.
Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.13 Like the suitability
obligation, the duties discussed above relate to all transactions within the
customer’s account, not just those that are recommendations.
When the broker is handling a discretionary account14, courts have
routinely held that the broker has a fiduciary duty to the customer. In Leib,
the court specifically set forth the duties the brokers owe customers:

13. 461 F. Supp. 951, 952-53 (E.D. Mich. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Leib v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981).
14. FINRA Rule 2510 pertains to discretionary accounts, and provides in part that
“[n]o member shall effect with or for any customer's account in respect to which
such member or his agent or employee is vested with any discretionary power any
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Unlike the broker who handles a nondiscretionary account,
the broker handling a discretionary account becomes the
fiduciary of his customer in a broad sense. Such a broker,
while not needing prior authorization for each transaction,
must (1) manage the account in a manner directly
comporting with the needs and objectives of the customer as
stated in the authorization papers or as apparent from the
customer's investment and trading history, Rolf v. Blyth
Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978); (2)
keep informed regarding the changes in the market which
affect his customer's interest and act responsively to protect
those interests (see in this regard, Robinson v. Merrill Lynch,
[337 F.Supp. 107 (N.D.Ala.1971)]); (3) keep his customer
informed as to each completed transaction; and (5) explain
forthrightly the practical impact and potential risks of the
course of dealing in which the broker is engaged, Stevens v.
Abbott, Proctor and Paine, 288 F.Supp. 836 (E.D.Va.1968).
[sic]
Some courts have also recognized that other circumstances create a
fiduciary relationship. In Marchese v. Nelson15, the court set out a brief
survey of various judicial approaches to determine whether a fiduciary
relationship has been created:
The Hotmar [v. Listrom & Co., 808 F.2d 1384, 1386 (10th
Cir.1987)] court, in finding no fiduciary relationship,
analyzed whether the broker agreed to manage or otherwise
control the account, or rather, whether he merely rendered
advice. Id. at 1387. Finding no agreement by the broker to
monitor his clients' nondiscretionary accounts, the court
found no fiduciary relationship. Id.
…
[T]he Baker [v. Wheat First Sec., 643 F.Supp. 1420, 1429
(S.D.W.Va.1986)] court found a fiduciary relationship where
the broker exerted “de facto control” over the account.
Baker, 643 F.Supp. at 1429. To the Baker court, such de
facto control existed when “‘the client routinely follows the
recommendations of the broker.’ ” Id. (quoting Mihara v.
Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir.1980)).
transactions of purchase or sale which are excessive in size or frequency in view of
the financial resources and character of such account.” FINRA Rule 2510(a).
15. 809 F.Supp. 880, 893 (D. Utah 1993)

2010]

FIDUCIARY DUTY

135

…
Finally, other courts assume the existence of a fiduciary
relationship even if the account is [non]discretionary [sic],
and then analyze the facts to determine the scope of the duty
and whether the broker breached the duty. See, e.g.,
Romano v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 834 F.2d
523, 530 (5th Cir.1987) (interpreting federal securities law).
Applying this analysis, the Romano court found no breach
where the customer, an alert and vigilant businessman,
controlled his nondiscretionary account and made all
decisions regarding activity in the account. Id. (citations
omitted).
In Leib, the court observed that although an account may be nondiscretionary, a broker may nonetheless have handled the account in a
manner more closely akin to a discretionary account. “Such an account is
one in which the broker has usurped actual control over a technically nondiscretionary account. In such cases, the courts have held that the broker
owes his customer the same fiduciary duties as he would have had the
account been discretionary from the moment of its creation.”16 Leib then set
forth several factors courts should consider in determining whether the
broker has usurped control over the account:
In determining whether a broker has assumed control of a
non-discretionary account the courts weigh several factors.
First, the courts examine the age, education, intelligence and
investment experience of the customer. Where the customer
is particularly young, Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich &
Frost, 447 F.Supp. 203 (D.Mass.1978), old, Hecht v. Harris,
supra, or naive with regard to financial matters, Marshak v.
Blyth Eastman Dillion & Co., Inc., 413 F.Supp. 377
(N.D.Okl.1975), the courts are likely to find that the broker
assumed control over the account. Second, if the broker is
socially or personally involved with the customer, the courts
are likely to conclude that the customer relinquished control
because of the relationship of trust and confidence. Kravitz v.
Pressman, supra; Hecht v. Harris, [430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir.
1970)]. Conversely, where the relationship between the
broker and the customer is an arms-length business
relationship, the courts are inclined to find that the customer
retained control over the account. Shorrock v. Merrill Lynch,
16. 461 F.Supp. at 954.
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[CCH Fed.Sec.L.Rep. P 96,251 (D.Or., Nov. 18, 1977)].
Third, if many of the transactions occurred without the
customer's prior approval, the courts will often interpret this
as a serious usurpation of control by the broker. Hecht v.
Harris, supra. Fourth, if the customer and the broker speak
frequently with each other regarding the status of the account
or the prudence of a particular transaction, the courts will
usually find that the customer, by maintaining such active
interest in the account, thereby maintained control over it.
Robinson v. Merrill Lynch, supra.
de Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc.17 also set forth ‘special
circumstances’ which can create a fiduciary duty on the part of the broker:
The transformative “special circumstances” recognized in
the cases are circumstances that render the client dependent
– a client who has impaired faculties, or one who has a
closer than arms-length relationship with the broker, or one
who is so lacking in sophistication that de facto control of
the account is deemed to rest in the broker. The law thus
imposes additional extra-contractual duties on brokers who
can take unfair advantage of their customers' incapacity or
simplicity. See, e.g., Societe Nationale D'Exploitation
Industrielle Des Tabacs Et Allumettes v. Salomon Bros. Int'l
Ltd., 251 A.D.2d 137, 674 N.Y.S.2d 648, 649
(App.Div.1998) (referring to the broker's “requisite high
degree of dominance and reliance”); Leib, 461 F.Supp. at
954 (referring to heightened duties where “broker has
usurped actual control,” such as a case involving a 77-yearold widow); cf. Robinson, 337 F.Supp. at 113 (absent an
express advisory contract, there is no fiduciary duty on part
of broker-dealer “unless the customer is infirm or ignorant of
business affairs”).
In addition to the nature of the account and the relationship between the
broker and the customer, the type of fees a customer pays is another factor in
determining whether or not a fiduciary duty exists. As noted earlier, the IAA
exempts brokers who provide investment advice so long as the advice is
incidental to the brokerage services, and the broker does not receive special
compensation for the advice. In 1999, the SEC expressed concern that
because brokerage firms were now offering fee-based accounts in addition to

17. 306 F.3d 1293, 1308-09 (2d Cir. 2002).
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commission-based accounts, they would be subject to the IAA.18 The SEC
recognized that customers were getting the same services regardless of the
broker’s compensation scheme. Ultimately, the SEC adopted a rule ensuring
that brokerage firms offering fee-based accounts would not be subject to the
IAA.19 However, in 2007, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that
the SEC did not have authority to broaden the exception set forth in the IAA,
and it struck down the rule.20 Hence, brokers who offer fee-based accounts
are deemed to receive special compensation under the IAA and are required
to be registered as investment advisers and as such, are subject to the
fiduciary obligations of the IAA.21
II.

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act

Dodd-Frank was signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010.
The final version of the bill was a compromise between the House and the
Senate versions. “Changes to the standards of conduct applied to brokerdealers and investment advisers were present in both the House and the
Senate versions of financial regulatory reform. However, the House and the
Senate had different approaches to this issue. The House approach was to
harmonize the fiduciary standard for brokers, dealers, and investment
advisers. The Senate approach was to have the SEC conduct a study to
evaluate the effectiveness of existing standards of conduct for brokers,
dealers, and investment advisers.”22

18. S.E.C. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 64 Fed. Reg. 61,228 (Nov. 10, 1999).
19. The Commission adopted final rule 202(a)(11)-1 under the IAA on April 15,
2005. See S.E.C. Rel. No. 34-51523, available at www.sec.gov/rules/final/3451523.pdf. However, the Commission did not take any actions against firms which
offered fee-based accounts between the issuance of the proposed rule in 1999 and the
adoption of the final rule in 2005.
20. Financial Planning Ass’n v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 482 F.3d 481
(D.C. 2007).
21. It should be noted that the IAA only confers a limited private right of action.
See Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,24, 100
S.Ct. 242, 349 (1979) (“For the reasons stated in this opinion, we hold that there
exists a limited private remedy under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to void an
investment advisers contract, but that the Act confers no other private causes of
action, legal or equitable.”).
22. MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41381, THE DODD-FRANK
WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
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Section 913 of Dodd-Frank is entitled, “Study and Rulemaking
Regarding Obligations of Brokers, Dealer, and Investment Advisors.”
Pursuant to subsection (b), the SEC is required to conduct a study to
evaluate:
(1) the effectiveness of existing legal or regulatory standards of
care for brokers, dealers, investment advisers, persons
associated with brokers or dealers, and persons associated
with investment advisers for providing personalized
investment advice and recommendations about securities to
retail customers imposed by the Commission and a national
securities association, and other Federal and State legal or
regulatory standards; and
(2) whether there are legal or regulatory gaps, shortcomings, or
overlaps in legal or regulatory standards in the protection of
retail customers relating to the standards of care for brokers,
dealers, investment advisers, persons associated with brokers
or dealers, and persons associated with investment advisers
for providing personalized investment advice about
securities to retail customers that should be addressed by rule
or statute.
Subsection (c) sets forth fourteen items that the SEC should consider when
conducting the study, and includes the catchall of anything not explicitly set
forth that the SEC deems necessary and appropriate. As summarized by the
Congressional Research Service:
Subsection (c) sets out what the SEC is required to consider
in conducting the study: (1) the effectiveness of current legal
or regulatory standards of care which have been imposed by
the SEC or a national securities association and other federal
and state legal or regulatory standards; (2) whether there are
legal or regulatory gaps, shortcomings, or overlaps in the
standards of conduct for protecting retail customers that
should be addressed by rule or statute; (3) whether retail
customers understand that there are different standards of
care applicable to brokers, dealers, and investment advisers
in the provision of personalized investment advice about
securities to retail customers; (4) whether the existence of
different standards of care concerning the quality of
personalized investment advice that retail customers receive
BROKERS, DEALERS, AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS (2010), available at
www.cq.com/displaycrsreport.do? docid=3729478.

OF
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is confusing to them; (5) the resources and activities of the
SEC, the states, and a national securities association to
enforce the standards of care, including the effectiveness of
examinations of brokers, dealers, and investment advisers in
determining compliance with regulations, the frequency of
examinations, and the length of time of the examinations; (6)
the substantive differences in regulating brokers, dealers, and
investment advisers in their providing personalized
investment advice and recommendations about securities to
retail customers; (7) specific instances concerning
personalized investment advice about securities in which
regulation and oversight of investment advisers provide
greater protection than regulation and oversight of brokers
and dealers and instances in which regulation and oversight
of brokers and dealers provide greater protection than
regulation and oversight of investment advisers; (8) existing
legal or regulatory standards of state securities regulators
and other regulators intended to protect retail customers; (9)
the potential impact on retail customers of imposing upon
brokers and dealers the standard of care applied under the
Investment Advisers Act; (10) the potential impact of
eliminating the broker and dealer exclusion from the
definition of “investment adviser” in the Investment
Advisers Act; (11) the varying level of services provided by
brokers, dealers, and investment advisers to retail customers;
(12) the potential impact on retail customers that could result
from changing the regulatory requirements or legal standards
of care affecting brokers, dealers, and investment advisers
concerning their obligations to retail customers about
investment advice; (13) the potential additional costs to retail
customers concerning the potential impact on the
profitability of their investment decisions and to brokers,
dealers, and investment advisers resulting from changes to
the regulatory requirements or legal standards affecting
brokers, dealers, or investment advisers; and (14) any other
consideration that the SEC considers necessary and
appropriate in determining whether to conduct a rulemaking.
Subsection (d) gives the SEC six months from the enactment of Dodd-Frank
to submit its report to both the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House
of Representatives. Subsection (e) requires the SEC to seek public

140

PIABA BAR JOURNAL

[Vol. 17 No. 2

comments in preparing its report. Subsection (f) permits the SEC to
“commence a rulemaking, as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
and for the protection of retail customers” which addresses the standard of
care a broker has towards a customer. Subsection (g) amends both the ’34
Act and the IAA to allow the SEC to issue rules governing the standards of
care owed by both brokers and investment advisers. 23 However, subsection
(g) specifically states that “[n]othing in this section shall require a broker or
dealer or registered representative to have a continuing duty of care or
loyalty to the customer after providing personalized investment advice about
securities.”
III. Concerns and Responses
In 2009, the Treasury Department issued a report entitled “Financial
Regulatory Reform - A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision
and Regulation”.24 The Report essentially addresses numbers (3) and (4) of
subsection (c) of section 913 of Dodd-Frank:
Retail investors are often confused about the differences
between
investment
advisers
and
broker-dealers.
Meanwhile, the distinction is no longer meaningful between
a disinterested investment advisor and a broker who acts as
an agent for an investor; the current laws and regulations are
based on antiquated distinctions between the two types of
financial professionals that date back to the early 20th
century. Brokers are allowed to give “incidental advice” in
the course of their business, and yet retail investors rely on a
trusted relationship that is often not matched by the legal
responsibility of the securities broker. In general, a brokerdealer’s relationship with a customer is not legally a
fiduciary relationship, while an investment adviser is legally
its customer’s fiduciary.
From the vantage point of the retail customer, however, an
investment adviser and a broker-dealer providing “incidental
advice” appear in all respects identical. In the retail context,
the legal distinction between the two is no longer
meaningful. Retail customers repose the same degree of
23. See id.
24. http://www financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf
2009).

(June

17,
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trust in their brokers as they do in investment advisers, but
the legal responsibilities of the intermediaries may not be the
same
SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro made similar observations when she
testified on July 22, 2009 before the United States House of Representatives
Committee on Financial Services25:
Many investors do not recognize the differences in standards
of conduct or the regulatory requirements applicable to
broker-dealers and investment advisers. When investors
receive similar services from similar financial service
providers, it is critical that the service providers be subject to
the same standard of conduct and equivalent regulatory
requirements, regardless of the label attached to the
providers.
I therefore believe that all financial service providers that
provide personalized investment advice about securities
should owe a fiduciary duty to their customers or clients and
be subject to equivalent regulation. As such, I support the
standard contained in the Department of the Treasury bill
recently put forth entitled the "Investor Protection Act of
2009." That bill explicitly would enable the Commission to
promulgate rules to provide all broker-dealers and
investment advisers providing investment advice to retail
customers act solely in the interest of their customers or
clients without regard to the financial or other interests of the
financial service professional. The establishment of this
investor-focused approach as a consistent standard for all
broker-dealers and investment advisers providing investment
advice would represent a significant step forward in the
protection of retail investors.
On July 27, 2010, the SEC published its request for public comment26 as
it was required to do pursuant to §913(e) of Dodd-Frank. By the date
comments were due, August 30, 2010, thousands of comments were posted
25. Regulatory Perspectives on the Obama Administration’s Financial Regulatory
Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the House Committee on Financial Services,
111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, S.E.C.); a copy of
the statement is available at www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts072209mls htm.
26. S.E.C. Release No. 34-62577; IA-3058, “Study Regarding Obligations of
Brokers, Dealers, and Investment Advisers”, available at www.sec.gov/rules/other/
2010/34-62577.pdf.
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on the SEC’s website. Many organizations commented, including PIABA27,
SIFMA28, AARP29, NASAA30, and the Investment Adviser Association31.
Each of these organizations supports a uniform standard for brokers and
investment advisers, but their opinions vary in terms of what that really
means.
CONCLUSION
It would be pure speculation at this point to try to determine what the
SEC will do in response to the study it is now conducting. One would hope
that the issues raised in connection with the confusion faced by customers
every day could be resolved. It seems easy to simply create a true uniform
fiduciary standard that would apply to any financial professional who does
business with a retail customer. The argument that doing so would be cost
prohibitive to brokerage firms, or that the diversity of products currently
offered to customers would suddenly dry up, lacks support. As set forth
above, in California, brokers are fiduciaries in the true sense. Yet that fact
has not caused brokers and brokerage firms to flee the state. On the contrary,
customers have the same opportunities to invest in California that they have
in New York. The only difference is that customers in California are
protected by the law and are not tasked with trying to determine what duties
their broker may owe them.
In a speech given at the Consumer Federation of America 21st Annual
Financial Services Conference on December 3, 2009, Chairman Schapiro32
described the risks of maintaining the status quo:
So, imagine an investor walking down Main Street in the
town where you grew up. He steps into the office of the
local securities professional and is handed a business card.
But he doesn't look to see whether it says broker-dealer
or investment adviser. Chances are he doesn't know the
difference. Or even care. All he wants is helpful, investorfocused advice, a fair deal and a professional he can trust.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4606-2737.pdf.
www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4606-2553.pdf.
www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4606-2549.htm.
www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4606-2607.pdf.
www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4606-2563.pdf.
www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch120309mls htm.
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These seem to me to be reasonable expectations. But
today that investor — whether he knows it or not — is
treated differently depending on what that business card
says. If it's a broker-dealer, he's sold a product that is,
"suitable" for him. If it's an investment adviser, he gets
treated under a higher standard — the fiduciary duty
standard — meaning that the investment adviser has to
provide advice that puts the investor's interest first.
Investors today should not be treated differently based
on what door they walk into — or based on what is written
on the business card they are handed.
Instead, I believe that all securities professionals should
be subject to the same fiduciary duty — and that all investors
receiving advice should rest assured that the advice they get
is being given with their interest at heart.
But, to be effective, the fiduciary duty needs to be
meaningful and uniform across all securities professionals. It
cannot be weakened or diluted just so that it can be applied
broadly.
The SEC’s report is required to be submitted to the two committees by
January 2011. Hopefully, by that time, the SEC will have begun the
rulemaking process to adopt rules that will impose a strong, uniform
fiduciary standard on both brokers and investment advisers.
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